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My aim is this paper is to explore the basis of the responsibilities we owe to refugees 
– responsibilities that we discharge primarily through our governments, though 
sometimes more directly when we decide to join a refugee support group, for 
example, or contribute to a charity.  That we have such responsibilities is a very widely 
shared intuition.  The picture we are likely to have of refugees, as desperate people 
trapped in miserable encampments or squashed together in unseaworthy boats trying 
to cross the Mediterranean, seems to call out for a response on our part.  But what 
exactly are our obligations to such people?  Who are they owed to and why do we 
have them? These are the questions I want to investigate here. 
Notice to begin with that the legal obligations that states have towards refugees 
leaving other states are quite narrow, and mostly negative in character – at least until 
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the refugee succeeds in entering the state’s territory, at which point a number of 
human-rights-related obligations cut in.2 There is no legal obligation to help refugees 
leave their home country, or to support them once they have crossed the border and 
are living in temporary accommodation.  There is no legal obligation to ensure their 
safety during passage or to make it easy for them to lodge asylum applications.  There 
is no legal obligation to offer refugees permanent resettlement.  States and 
international organizations often do provide assistance of all these kinds, but on a 
voluntary basis.  Those that decline to do so may be criticized, but they are never 
sanctioned.  Yet many of us think that states and their citizens have moral obligations 
that are considerably more demanding than this – obligations to take in refugees and 
therefore to open up safe avenues through which they can make asylum applications, 
obligations to mount rescue missions on behalf of refugees who are making 
hazardous journeys, obligations to provide financial and other forms of support for 
those who are currently living in poor conditions in third countries.  The question, 
though, is why we think this.  Why does being a refugee give a person such a strong 
moral claim on us?  What is the source of their special rights and the obligations we 
owe in return? 
Refugees are needy people – that much is obvious.  By fleeing from their home 
states, they make themselves vulnerable to various kinds of harms.  But that alone 
does not distinguish them from millions of other people who are not refugees, but 
towards whom we appear not to have the same moral responsibilities, such as those 
living under repressive regimes or in severe poverty.  Is it just that refugees are more 
visibly in need, that they press themselves upon our attention by trying to enter our 
societies (though of course only a small minority actually take that step)?  But that 
surely could not justify a special obligation towards them, even though it might 
explain why we believe we have one.  We should look for a firmer basis for 
responsibilities to refugees. 
Nevertheless, the first path that I want to explore says that our obligations to 
refugees are essentially humanitarian in nature.  They are people in great need, and we 
have the resources to meet those needs at modest cost to ourselves.  The analogy that 
is often drawn here is with the individual duty of rescue.  The duty of rescue is the 
duty each of us has to save a fellow-human being from death or serious harm when 
one can do so at relatively small cost to oneself.  The classic example, introduced by 
Peter Singer and much-discussed since, involves a passer-by pulling a drowning child 
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out of a shallow pond at the cost of ruining the expensive suit he is wearing.3  
Confronted with the example, almost everyone agrees that the passer-by has a duty 
to save the child, that it would be seriously wrong for him to carry on walking just 
because he is going to miss an appointment or doesn’t want to spoil his suit.  Since 
refugees, likewise, are facing an imminent threat of death or serious harm, it is very 
tempting to model our obligations towards them on the duty of rescue.  Indeed, in 
the case of those trapped on sinking boats half way across the Mediterranean, the 
analogy seems particularly close.  The ongoing refugee crisis looks like Singer’s pond 
multiplied many times over.  
Tempting though the rescue model is, I am going to argue that that it should be 
rejected.  Let’s begin by noticing some special features of the pond case as described 
by Singer that make the conclusion that the passer-by has a duty to rescue the child 
so compelling.4  There is only one adult walking past the pond, so there is no question 
where the responsibility to carry out the rescue falls.  The child is just a child, and 
therefore not responsible for having got herself into difficulties.  The rescue will have 
no further consequences beyond the saved child and the ruined suit: there are no 
other children around, so no danger that any of them will be tempted to jump into 
the pond in anticipation of being rescued.  And the child herself, we would naturally 
assume, will be returned to her anxious parents and live a happy life thereafter.  The 
cost of the rescue is very small compared to the expected benefit. 
If we were to change some of these features, for instance by introducing 
multiple possible rescuers, or by turning the child into a teenager who has ignored a 
large warning sign advising him not to swim, then we might begin to wonder whether 
the man in the fancy suit still has a duty, as opposed merely to a reason, to plunge 
into the pond.  In other words, we may begin to ask exactly how the duty to rescue 
arises, who bears it, what its outer limits are, and so forth. 
To see what implications this has for our duties towards refugees, consider 
European experience over the last few years.  The first and most obvious feature is 
that we are looking at several million refugees trying to move to Europe, and at least 
28 states with some capacity to offer them refuge.  So at once the question arises: how 
does any particular state acquire an obligation towards a particular refugee?  It looks 
immediately as though we are facing a problem of distribution: if refugees are going 
to be admitted or resettled, how many is each state required to take?  How is that 
question to be decided? 
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The second factor that differentiates the refugee case from the pond case is that 
the refugees are exercising agency in order to put themselves into the position where 
European states are forced to respond by rescuing and/or admitting them, while the 
child, we assume, just fell into the pond by accident.  Typically refugees from 
countries such as Syria have to decide whether to sit out their period of exile in refugee 
camps, or by scratching a living in one of the nearby host states like Lebanon, in the 
hope that they will in due course be able to return home, or alternatively to bet what 
is often their lifetime’s savings on buying a passage to Europe in the hope of being 
admitted there.  Now this is far from being a voluntary choice in the full sense:  it is 
a choice made under very difficult circumstances.  So by pointing to the agency of the 
refugees, I am not trying to suggest that they are to be held fully responsible for their 
later predicament.  Nonetheless it is important to see that because agency is involved, 
the behaviour of refugees is going to be influenced by the policy decisions that 
receiving states make, once these become known.  If refugees can expect to be rescued 
and then granted asylum, they are more likely to embark on the journey in the first 
place. 
The third factor that bears upon the question whether refugees are owed a 
humanitarian duty of rescue is the potential cost of doing so, particularly if rescue 
takes the form of admitting them on a temporary or permanent basis to a Western 
state.  There is of course an argument about whether over the long term these states 
will derive a net benefit from admitting refugees once they are allowed to become 
fully participating members of society.  But in the short term there are quite heavy 
processing and support costs, plus the possible costs to social cohesion if the numbers 
being taken in are large.  This makes the case very different from the individual duty 
of rescue where the costs that need to be taken into account are only the immediate 
costs involved in the act of rescue itself. 
The question, then, is what guidance a humanitarian approach will give us in the 
case of refugees, assuming that the resources we are willing to deploy are limited – 
humanitarian aid has to compete with all the other objectives that governments and 
individuals want to pursue.  In such circumstances – and here thinking about the 
analogy with the allocation of scarce medical resources can be instructive – we would 
normally want to consider two criteria.  First, who are the people most in need of our 
help?  Second, how effectively can they be helped given the resources at our disposal?  
These two factors have to be traded off against each other, since unfortunately it is 
sometimes impossible to do much to help the very worst cases.  Applying this to the 
case of refugees, our first observation must be that there is nothing from a 
humanitarian perspective to single out refugees as especially deserving of help.  There 
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is no reason to think, for example, that they are more vulnerable overall than those 
who have stayed behind in the countries they have left, and therefore remain subject 
to the persecution or generalized violence that caused the refugees to leave.  Nor are 
they necessarily worse off in absolute terms than the millions of people worldwide 
who fall below the UN’s poverty line, regardless of whether they are oppressed in 
other ways.   
Are refugees special because they can be helped more effectively with limited 
resources than other needy people?  This might be the case for those sheltering in 
refugee camps.  Refugee camps are much maligned nowadays in the academic 
literature, but remain popular with governments, presumably because people are 
visibly being helped at relatively small per capita cost, so it is easy to justify allocating 
money for this purpose.  There are also no obvious incentive effects or unintended 
consequences to take into account as there often are with other forms of aid.  So from 
a humanitarian perspective, refugees who stay in camps might merit our special 
attention.  This will not carry over, however, to those who apply for resettlement or 
attempt to enter directly into Western states.  Taking them in is not an efficient use 
of resources, and they are also unlikely to be among the neediest cases, as has often 
been pointed out with reference to those who pay smugglers extortionate sums to 
transport them by land or sea. 
What I am trying to do here is draw attention to the limitations of a humanitarian 
way of understanding our responsibilities to refugees.  If we start from humanitarian 
premises, refugees won’t in general register as special cases.  I am hardly the first to 
notice this.  Peter Singer, who as we saw was responsible for popularizing the 
drowning child analogy, was certainly sympathetic to the plight of refugees, but could 
see no reason to distinguish between those fleeing persecution and those fleeing 
drought, or between those applying for asylum and those remaining in camps.  As he 
put it ‘immigration policy in general, and refugee intake in particular, should be based 
on the interests of all those affected, either directly or indirectly, whether as an 
immediate result of the policy, or in the long run’.5  Singer’s approach, which allows 
no special weight to be given to the interests of fellow-citizens, would certainly 
produce radical policy conclusions as far as admitting immigrants is concerned, but 
offers no special protection to refugees. 
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the ethical and political issues (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), p. 121. 
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So, let’s consider a very different way of thinking about responsibilities to 
refugees, what’s sometimes called the political approach. 6 Here we begin by 
contemplating the entire system of states in its current form, and consider the 
refugee’s position in relation to that.  What is distinctive about a refugee, from this 
perspective, is that the bond that would normally link her to her home state has 
broken down.  She is forced to leave because that state is either unable or unwilling 
to protect her basic rights.  But where is she to move to?  States now claim jurisdiction 
over the entire habitable surface of the earth, so she can only escape from her own 
state by entering another.  What, then, gives any state the right to exclude her?  By 
claiming jurisdiction over its territory, along with other states, doesn’t it 
simultaneously acquire the obligation to admit those who are in need of refuge and 
have no other recourse?  
This approach portrays our obligations to refugees as remedial in nature.  Taken 
together, states have grabbed all the available land and fenced it in, so human beings 
can no longer exercise their natural right to wander freely over the earth’s surface.   
There may be good arguments in favour of territorial rights, but these rights come 
with a cost, and in the case of refugees the cost takes the form of having nowhere to 
escape to unless another state is willing to provide refuge.  So, the argument 
concludes, states must compensate refugees for the loss of freedom they have 
suffered by granting them rights of entry.  This doesn’t imply that a refugee can 
demand entry to any state that she chooses, since the reparative obligation lies with 
the system of states as a whole.  But it does mean that if a state is going to deny entry 
to a refugee, it must prove that there is some other acceptable state willing to take her 
in. 
Does this political approach do a good job of explaining our responsibilities to 
refugees?  As I’ve said, it has the virtue of explaining what makes refugees distinctive 
– their loss of a normal political relationship with their home state.  It explains why 
the paradigm case of a refugee is a Convention refugee who faces a threat of 
persecution, though it need not limit the class of refugees so narrowly as this, since a 
comparable loss is suffered who suffer from generalized violence in a collapsed state 
like Syria or Somalia, for example.  It also promises to deliver a stronger obligation to 
remedy the harm that refugees have borne.  This is because reparative obligations are 
not subject to limitations of cost in the way that humanitarian obligations are.  For 
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example, if I carelessly damage one of your possessions – a Ming vase, say – I have 
to make good the damage even if it costs me a lot to do so.  In contrast, where an 
obligation to prevent harm is simply humanitarian in nature, it is subject to a 
reasonable cost limitation.  This is widely recognized in the literature on the duty of 
rescue, and equally in the law of states that impose such a duty via so-called Bad 
Samaritan laws.  The duty applies only where the victim faces death or serious injury, 
and the rescuer can carry out the rescue at relatively minor cost to herself, judged by 
some standard of what can be reasonably asked of them (as we saw, Singer’s example 
involves ruining your suit to save a child).  Applying this now to the case of refugees, 
a humanitarian approach will limit our responsibilities to what can be done without 
incurring significant economic or social costs, whereas the political approach imposes 
no such limitation. 
These are important advantages of the political approach.  But it faces at least 
two challenges.  The first is to explain why loss of political membership should be so 
important as compared to other harms that a person might suffer.  Of course in many 
cases loss of political membership will bring with it vulnerability in other dimensions 
too – lack of access to food, education, health care, etc.  But suppose for a moment 
that these can be provided in a secure zone outside of the state, would it matter so 
much that people were deprived of effective citizenship?  Would this be their main 
concern, as opposed, for example, to finding work?  In our thinking we may be 
influenced by an Arendtian conception of active engagement in politics as central to 
the good life for human beings, but even if Arendt is right that political action is the 
highest form of human activity, it’s not so clear that our primary goal in responding 
to people in need, such as refugees, should be to restore them to full political agency.7 
The second challenge is to show why the very existence of refugees puts in 
question the legitimacy of all existing states, even when they have played no direct 
part in creating the refugee crisis.  The assumption is that a legitimate state must be 
able to justify its existence to everyone outside its borders, in the sense that if 
challenged to justify its right to exclude it can point to the fact that those excluded 
have states of their own to accommodate them.  It’s the failure of this last condition 
in the case of refugees that is said to give rise to an obligation to grant them asylum.   
The question is whether this doesn’t set the justificatory bar too high.  Why isn’t it 
sufficient, to justify a claim to exercise jurisdiction over a territory, to show that those 
who are excluded had adequate opportunities to establish their own rights-protecting 
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states?  The fact that they have not succeeded in doing so – that they are now living 
under a dictatorship or in failed states – does not impugn our own successful creation 
of a rights-respecting political order.   
In response, defenders of the political approach may argue that the states who 
are now being asked to admit refugees have indeed played some part in creating the 
circumstances that turned them into refugees in the first place.  In some cases this 
will of course be true.  But their responsibility does not reside in the mere fact of 
having established exclusive territorial jurisdiction.  Instead what matters is having 
engaged in policies such as selling dictators weapons that are then turned on their 
own subjects, or intervening militarily, perhaps in a good cause, but in a way that 
causes massive social dislocation, and therefore later on a refugee crisis.  So the danger 
here is that the political approach may give us strong obligations to a minority of 
refugees, namely those who can demonstrate that the state they are trying to enter 
bears some fairly direct responsibility for their being refugees, but fail to explain why 
we have responsibilities to those who don’t qualify on these grounds. 
So let me now turn to a third way of understanding our responsibilities to 
refugees.  This is to see them as one component of the wider responsibility on the 
part of all states to protect human rights.  Of course, such a responsibility is primarily 
discharged by each state fulfilling the human rights of its own citizens.  But in the 
international order that has grown up in the last fifty or so years, states have 
increasingly come to acknowledge a reciprocal responsibility to protect the human 
rights of people outside their borders when their own states either cannot or will not 
do so.  In the extreme case this may justify armed intervention to protect people from 
ethnic cleansing or genocide; this is what the so-called ‘Responsibility to Protect’ 
mandates.  But we can interpret refugee protection as forming part of the same 
general responsibility, whether this takes the form of granting refugees asylum or 
supporting them while they remain in third countries. 
This argument for a responsibility to protect refugees is less foundational than 
the other two approaches I’ve discussed.  It grounds protection in the emerging state 
practice of protecting human rights.  In other words, it points to the fact that liberal 
democracies, especially, have signed up to human rights protection by endorsing 
various international covenants and charters and also by embedding human rights in 
their own domestic constitutions.  The message, in other words, is ‘you’ve committed 
yourselves to these principles by signing these documents; now act on them’.  The 
corresponding drawback, however, is that the human rights approach has no purchase 
against a state that simply refuses to recognize these rights even in the case of its own 
citizens. 
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Despite this weakness, I think that the human rights approach provides the best 
way to think about responsibilities to refugees.  First, it gives us a way of identifying 
and prioritising refugees in terms of the nature and extent of the human rights 
violations from which they are suffering.  It explains why the prime candidates for 
support should be those refugees who fit the strict Geneva Convention definition8 – 
they face a serious threat of persecution – since in these case the rights violation is 
deliberate; whereas, as we saw, a humanitarian approach focussing simply on how 
badly off people are in general has difficulty in explaining why refugees have special 
claims.  Second, it highlights the fact that responsibilities to refugees are shared 
between all of the states that have committed themselves to the general practice of 
human rights protection.  Of course, a refugee will normally make an application for 
asylum to a particular state, and that state will have an immediate responsibility to 
respond to his request.  But since the underlying responsibility is shared, and the 
weight of applications may fall much more heavily on some states than on others, this 
points directly towards a burden-sharing scheme.  Since processing asylum 
applications in a way that itself meets human rights standards is both time-consuming 
and costly, burden-sharing should apply not only with respect to the final destinations 
to which refugees are admitted but also to the application process.  So in 
circumstances such as we’ve experienced in Europe in recent years, where for reasons 
of geography a few states have to process a vastly disproportionate number of 
applications, either they must be compensated by financial transfers from less 
burdened states, or a central system for assessing asylum requests has to be set up. 
This is what should happen, but as experience tells us, it is difficult in practice 
to get even nominally rights-respecting states to agree on a burden-sharing scheme.9  
                                                          
8 According to the 1951 Geneva Convention, a refugee is defined as a person who ‘owing to a well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to 
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country’ (cited in J. Hathaway, The 
Rights of Refugees under International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 96-7.  This 
does not of course cover all the cases in which a person can only protect his human rights by crossing 
a border.  I have discussed the relative merits of wider and narrower definitions of ‘refugee’ in D. 
Miller, Strangers in our Midst: The Political Philosophy of Immigration (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2016), ch. 5. 
9 For discussion of such schemes, and the criteria that might be used to determine what each state’s 
refugee quota should be, see P Schuck, ‘Refugee Burden-Sharing: A Modest Proposal’, Yale Journal of 
International Law, 22 (1997), 243-97; J. Hathaway and R. Neve, ‘Making Internal Refugee Law Relevant 
Again: A Proposal for Collectivised and Solution-Oriented Protection’, Harvard Human Rights Journal, 
10 (1997), 115-211; A. Hans and A. Suhrke, ‘Responsibility Sharing’ in J. Hathaway (ed.), Reconceiving 
International Refugee Law (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1997), pp. 83-109; A. Suhrke, ‘Burden-sharing 
during Refugee Emergencies: The Logic of Collective versus National Action’, Journal of Refugee Studies, 
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One reason is that there can be legitimate disagreement over how many refugees 
should be admitted directly or offered resettlement and how many should be 
supported financially in third countries. Disagreement on this question seems to have 
been one of the main reasons why the EU has proved unable to come up with a 
scheme that commands consensus across all member-states.  But suppose we set this 
issue to one side and assume for the moment that the number of refugees who require 
admission is known.  What principles should we use to distribute them among the 
states who have agreed to take part in the scheme?  The one that is likely to strike us 
as immediately salient is the equal sharing of cost: the citizens of each participating 
country should be asked to bear the same per capita cost. This way of framing the 
problem as a cost-sharing question is sometimes challenged by pointing out that when 
refugees are resettled they usually make a significant economic contribution to the 
society they join, so they should be considered as an asset rather than a burden.  But 
although this may be true in the long run, in the short term the financial costs of 
admitting and integrating refugees is significant (in the German case the total cost for 
2016, obviously a peak year, was put at €20 billion).  Moreover the real societal cost 
of admitting a refugee will vary considerably, depending on society-specific factors 
such as the costs of supporting asylum-seekers while their cases are adjudicated, the 
rules governing their access to the labour market, whether the job-related skills they 
bring complement those of existing workers or compete with them, the social costs 
of integration, and so forth.  An additional problem is that the costs are likely to be 
lower in the case of states that already have a long history of admitting immigrants 
and have developed multicultural and other policies whose aim is to make it easier for 
immigrants to integrate successfully.  Thus for a state like Canada the marginal cost 
of taking in additional refugees will be lower than in the case of a non-immigrant 
society such as Japan.  It might, however, seem anomalous that a country that has a 
good record of receiving refugees should for that reason be asked to take relatively 
more under a burden-sharing scheme. 
So finding an agreed solution to the burden-sharing problem is going to be 
difficult.  Equal cost-sharing is attractive in principle, but difficult to apply, and 
insensitive to historical factors that affect relative costs but don’t seem relevant to the 
number that should now be taken in.  But let’s suppose these difficulties could be 
resolved and we could come up with an assignment of responsibility for refugees 
between states that is widely agreed to be fair.  How should we characterise the 
responsibility that each state bears in the presence of such a scheme?  I shall argue 
                                                          
11 (1998), 396-415; T. Kritzman-Amir, ‘Not in My Backyard: On the Morality of Responsibility 
Sharing in Refugee Law’, Brooklyn Journal of International Law, 34 (2009), 355-93. 
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that it becomes a matter of justice that each state should carry out the obligations that 
it has under the scheme.  It is a matter of justice, first, because the human rights of 
the refugees are under threat if they are not aided, and there is a group of agents with 
the collective capacity to provide the aid; and second because the corresponding 
responsibility has been divided up in such a way that each member of the relevant 
collective has a defined obligation – namely to grant temporary or permanent 
admission to N refugees, where N will typically vary from one state to the next. 
Why does it matter that under the stated conditions our responsibilities to 
refugees crystallise into duties of justice?  It matters because duties of justice are 
normally enforceable, and are certainly enforceable when basic human rights are 
under threat if the duties are not carried out.  So this means that both the refugees 
themselves and third parties can take steps to ensure that the refugees get what they 
are owed, including applying sanctions to states that are unwilling to comply. 
But suppose that these measures do not succeed, and some states who are party 
to the scheme refuse to take in their share of the refugees who need sanctuary.  What 
then is the position of the states that have already discharged their responsibility?  Are 
they obliged to take up the slack that’s been left by the non-compliant states?  The 
general issue this raises – whether justice requires us not only to discharge our share 
of a collective responsibility but also to take up the slack in the event that others fail 
to discharge theirs – has become a point of controversy in the philosophical 
literature.10  Those who argue that compliant states are obliged to accept more 
refugees than their quota requires claim that the unprotected human rights of the 
refugees coupled with the capacity of these states to offer them shelter decides the 
issue.11  That is, there might indeed be an upper limit where taking in yet more 
refugees would pose a serious threat to social order, but until that limit is reached 
states are obliged to accept surplus refugees that other states had a duty of justice to 
accommodate. 
                                                          
10 See, for example L. J. Cohen, ‘Who is Starving Whom?’, Theoria, 47 (1981), 65-81; L. Murphy, Moral 
Demands in Nonideal Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), ch. 7; D. Miller, ‘Taking Up 
the Slack: Responsibility and Justice in Situations of Partial Compliance’ in C. Knight and Z. 
Stemplowska (eds.), Responsibility and Distributive Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 
reprinted in D. Miller, Justice for Earthlings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); A. Karnein, 
‘Putting Fairness in its Place: Why there is a Duty to Take up the Slack’, Journal of Philosophy, 111 
(2014), 593-607; Z. Stemplowska, ‘Doing More than One’s Fair Share’, Critical Review of International 
Social and Political Philosophy, 19 (2016), 591-608. 
11 See, for example, D. Owen, ‘Refugees, fairness and taking up the slack: On justice and the 
International Refugee Regime’, Moral Philosophy and Politics, 3(2016), 141-64, and the discussion of 
Owen’s view in M. Hoesch, ‘“Taking up the Slack” in the Context of Refugee Protection: Remarks 
on David Owen’, Zeitschrift für Ethik und Moralphilosophie, 1 (2018), 163-75. 
48 David Miller 
In my view this argument fails to take seriously the idea of acquiring duties of 
justice by virtue of a division of responsibility.  It begs the question by assuming that 
each state has an open-ended obligation to protect the human rights of refugees, 
despite forming part of group of states who share a collective responsibility to provide 
that protection.  But justice couldn’t require us to bear obligations of that kind.  If ten 
of us together owe a debt to Brown, what justice requires is that I should pay my 
share of the debt.  If I can afford to do so, I might generously agree to cover the debts 
of the other members of the group, or there might be circumstances in which each of 
us agrees to discharge the liability on one another’s behalf.  But those special 
circumstances aside, discharging other people’s duties of justice for them isn’t 
something that justice requires.  And it would generally be very hazardous to make an 
agreement to do so, because it amounts to an open invitation to default in the 
knowledge that someone else will take up the slack on your behalf. 
Why is it so important to be clear about what justice requires and what it doesn’t 
in circumstances of collective responsibility?  Shouldn’t debates like this be set aside 
given the often desperate plight of the refugees who are trying to be admitted?  I think 
it does matter to know what justice demands and what it doesn’t, even in 
circumstances such as these.  If something indeed required by justice, then it is 
mandatory and, as I noted earlier, it can be enforced by third parties.  So a state that 
has complied with its obligations under a burden-sharing scheme is entitled to use 
reasonable means to force other states to comply with their obligations.  Suppose, 
though that this does not succeed: what then?  My view is that further responsibilities 
to refugees on the part of the compliant state would be humanitarian in nature only.  
In other words, the general humanitarian reasons we have to help people in need that 
I discussed earlier would still apply in these circumstances; but there would be no 
special responsibilities to refugees as such. The additional refugees could not claim a 
right to be admitted to a state that had done its share of admissions under a burden-
sharing scheme, and the state in question would have no enforceable obligation to 
admit them.  
The state in question might nonetheless decide to do more, for humanitarian 
reasons, and this would be admirable.  But in a democracy, this requires the consent 
of the people who are going to bear the costs of admitting refugees over and above 
the burden-sharing quota.  For consent to be obtained, there needs to be widespread 
democratic debate, among political representatives and civil society groups, and 
perhaps even a popular vote, before a decision of this kind is taken.  Hostility towards 
refugees, and towards immigrants more generally, is often a response by citizens to a 
sense that that they are being imposed upon, that they have lost control of the process 
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whereby migrants are selected and admitted.  Conversely, where they feel that they 
are able to make choices, they are often remarkably generous, as we see in the case of 
those volunteering to assist refugees or engaging in resettlement programmes.  One 
might hope that this generosity would also be shown when a democratic decision on 
taking in more refugees than fairness demands was being made. 
To conclude, I’ve been looking at three ways of understanding the 
responsibilities that we, as citizens, bears towards refugees.  I argued that that the 
humanitarian approach, although initially appealing, fails to explain what is special 
about refugees as opposed to other people who are also in dire need.  The political 
approach does a good job on this front, but it overstates the intrinsic importance of 
political membership, and relies on a contestable theory of political legitimacy.  I 
therefore favoured what I have called the human rights approach, while admitting 
that it relies on the contingent fact that many states today have officially committed 
themselves to human rights protection.  I then explored what this would mean in 
practice, arguing that responsibilities towards refugees should be fairly divided 
between the states by setting up a burden-sharing scheme. 
So what, then, are our responsibilities to refugees?  As a matter of justice, to 
urge our governments to help establish and then comply with an international scheme 
of refugee protection.  As a matter of humanity, to consider volunteering to help 
refugee charities, and to contemplate voting in support of taking up the slack if other 
countries fail in their duties of aid towards refugees. 
